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Abstract
We study wage effects of two important elements of non-wage labour costs: firing
costs and payroll taxes. We exploit a reform that introduced substantial reduction
in these two provisions for unemployed workers aged less than thirty and over forty-
five years who got a permanent job. A matching model with heterogeneous workers
predicts positive wage effects of reducing firing costs but ambiguous wage effects
of reducing payroll taxes, for both new entrant and incumbent workers. Difference-
in-differences estimates and simulation of the model show positive wage effects for
both new entrant and incumbent workers. The reduction in firing costs accounts
for up to half of the overall wage increase for new entrants but only 10 per cent for
incumbents.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, several European countries have reduced employment protection and
payroll taxes to improve the performance of the labour market (see Kugler (2007) for
employment protection legislation (EPL) reforms and Carone, Nicodme, and Schmidt
(2007) for recent changes in payroll taxes).1 However, the estimation and evaluation
of the causal effects of the changes have proved difficult, since most changes have been
gradual (i.e. not sharp) and accross the board (i.e. applied to everyone).
In 1997, Spain drastically reduced dismissal costs and payroll taxes for young and old
workers only, which provides a unique natural setting to examine the effects of non-wage
labour costs. Severance payments for unfair dismissals were reduced 20%, while payroll
taxes decreased between 40% and 60%, depending on the targeted group. These sharp
changes, which applied only to some age groups, provide a unique opportunity to examine
the causal effects of firing costs and payroll taxes on employment and wages.
There is an increasing amount of empirical evidence, which points that stringent em-
ployment protection regulation affects employment flows (Autor, Donohue, and Schwab
(2004, 2006); Kugler and Pica (2003, 2008); Marinescu (2009); Martins (2009)). However,
evidence on wage effects is very scarce and not very conclusive. Leonardi and Pica (2014)
analyse an increase in firing costs implemented in Italy for small firms and find that more
stringent employment protection has a negative impact on entry and subsequent wages.
Martins (2009) finds no reaction of wages to an increase in dismissal-for-cause costs only
for large firms in Portugal, and van der Wiel (2010) finds positive wage effects of extending
employer’s term of notice in the Netherlands.2
The incidence of payroll taxes also gathers mixed evidence. Generally speaking, when
1For instance, in the late 1980s France relaxed employment protection provisions to facilitate employ-
ment for certain types of workers, and Germany has recently (in 2004) exempted small firms (from 5 to
10 employees) from EPL. Payroll taxes decreased in the EU-27 from 7.5% to 7.3% of GDP between 1995
and 2005, and the Nordic countries have been reducing payroll taxes selectively for some regions since
the mid 1980s.
2The extent to which severance costs are shifted from employers to employees in the form of lower wages
depends on maket imperfections or information problems. For instance, in situations of low institutional
trust, the cost of severance pay may not be entirely shifted to workers under the standard severance pay
system, where employers are required to pay severance at the time of separation, due to a problem of
moral hazard, if workers fear that firms will declare bankruptcy and will not pay. Kugler (2005) studies
the effect of a new system of severance payment savings account in Colombia, where firms are required
to deposit a percentage of wages into guaranteed individual accounts available to workers in the event
of job separation, and finds a substantial wage reduction that results from reducing the moral hazard
problem.
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employees perceive a close link between employers’ contributions and their benefits, payroll
taxes are likely to be fully shifted from firms to employees, with no disemployment effects
(see Gruber (1997) for Chile or Bennmarker, Mellander, and O¨ckert (2009) for Sweeden).
However, with a loose link between taxes and benefits, payroll taxes are usually not fully
passed on to employees and employment decreases.3 In a recent study for Argentina,
Cruces, Galiani, and Kidyba (2010) exploit regional variations in tax rates and find that
changes in payroll tax rates are only partially shifted onto wages with negligible effects
on employment, due to rigid labour demand and supply functions. Small changes have
also been found easier to pass on to employees than large changes (Gruber (1997)).
Our analysis focusses on the wage effects of firing costs and payroll taxes.4 To do so, we
extend the matching model with heterogeneous workers put forth by Dolado, Jansen, and
Jimeno (2007) in two important ways to accomodate the salient features of the Reform.
We consider the joint effect of payroll taxes and firing costs on wages, and since the reform
basically targets the entry wage of two groups of workers, we consider a different wage
bargaining process for new entrants than for incumbent workers.
The theoretical model predicts an ambiguous effect on wages for both new entrant and
incumbent workers. While payroll taxes have an unclear effect on wages, firing costs in new
entry positions reduce wages. This result takes place in new entrants because, since firing
costs are not operational in entry jobs, firms can translate part of them to the new jobs,
reducing the workers ‘implicit’ bargaining power. In the case of incumbents, an increase
in firing costs of new entry positions decrease their wages because they expect a lower
match surplus in case of moving to a new job position. As a result, incumbent employees
are more willing to decrease their current wage in order to reduce the probability of being
separated from the firm.
We provide two sets of complimentary evidence, from estimations and from simula-
tions, which yield consistent results. Estimates come from a microeconometric analysis of
panel individual administrative records, while simulations are obtained by first calibrating
the model and then simulating the reform.
3This may be the case for pay-as-you-go social security systems, such as the Spanish one, with weak
linkages between pensions and other benefits, on the one hand, and contributions, on the other.
4We also discuss briefly the implications of changing firing costs and payroll taxes on employment. In
Cervini Pla´, Ramos, and Silva (2010), the companion and more extensive working paper, we provide a
more detailed discussion.
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We exploit the variation of firing costs and payroll taxes across age groups (young,
prime-age, and older) and over time (before and after 1997), and identify the effects of
the reform using a difference-in-differences estimator, i.e. we compare wages of younger
and older individuals with those of prime-age individuals, before and after the reform.
Our main findings suggest that decreased firing costs and payroll taxes have a positive
effect on the wages (and employment) of new hired workers. Estimated effects are larger
for older than for younger workers and for men than for women. Wages of incumbent
workers also increase, but to a lesser extent. Our simulations show that the reduction in
firing costs accounts for up to half of the overall wage increase for new entrants but only
10 per cent for incumbents.
The experience of Spain should also provide direct evidence on the effects other coun-
tries might expect from a decision to promote (permanent) employment by reducing
non-wage labour costs. Since firing costs and payroll taxes account for a large proportion
of overall non-wage labour costs in many countries, they are likely to be used in the future
to boost employment, as they have been extensively used in the past. Our results suggest
that a substantial cut in non-wage labour costs has an important and substantial effect.
Our paper contributes to the small but growing literature that uses large policy changes
within a country over time or across groups to evaluate their labour market effects. Our
analysis makes several advances over previous studies. The source of identification in
this paper, the age discontinuity, is unique compared to previous literature examining the
impact of firing costs or payroll taxes on wages, which has relied on firm size discontinuities
(Martins (2009), Leonardi and Pica (2014)), differences in tenure (van der Wiel (2010),
Marinescu (2009)) or regional differences (Bennmarker, Mellander, and O¨ckert (2009),
Cruces, Galiani, and Kidyba (2010)). The data we use is a unique longitudinal data set
which contains information on individual job histories from social security records and
basic individual information from the census. Thus, we can work with all relevant job
spells instead of quarterly data, as provided for instance by the Labour Force Survey. We
use information on previous unemployment spells to overcome the selection into treatment
problem we face when estimating the causal effects on wages, which results from those
getting new permanent employment not being a random sample of the unemployment
pool. Moreover, our theoretical model fits the salient features of the policy change and
helps disentangle the impact of firing costs and payroll taxes.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Next we briefly describe the main
changes brought about by the 1997 Spanish labour market reform, while Section 3 ac-
commodates the salient features of the reform into a matching model with heterogenous
workers. Section 4 explains our identification strategy and section 5 presents the data.
Our main estimation results are reported in Section 6. Finally, section 7, summarises the
main findings of the paper.
2 Institutional background
Employment protection legislation and especially firing costs have undergone substantial
changes in the last twenty five years in Spain. In the early 1990s, nearly one third of
overall employment in Spain was temporary –twice the European average–, and nearly
all new hires signed temporary contracts (Guell and Petrongolo (2007)), which entailed
lower severance payments than permanent contracts when separation took place earlier
than agreed or nil when the termination date was observed, and whose termination could
not be appealed. Such a rapid increase in temporary employment, brought about by
a liberalisation in the use of temporary contracts that took place in 1984, led to a dual
labour market (insider-outsider) and segmentation problems between unstable low-paying
jobs and stable high-paying jobs (Dolado, Garc´ıa-Serrano, and Jimeno (2002)).
In order to increase the share of permanent employment, and after a first unsuccessful
reform in 1994,5 the 1997 reform substantially lowered firing costs for unfair dismissals6
and payroll taxes to newly signed permanent contracts, when the worker belonged to cer-
tain population groups. This is the so-called Permanent Emploment Promotion (PEP)
contract. In particular, severance payments for unfair dismissals were cut by about 25%
5The new regulations introduced with the 1994 reform restricted the use of temporary contracts to
seasonal jobs and tried to reduce dismissal costs for permanent contracts by relaxing the conditions for
’fair’ dismissals of workers under permanent contracts. In particular, the definition of ’fair’ dismissal was
widened by including additional ’economic reasons’ for dismissals. However, as Dolado, Garc´ıa-Serrano,
and Jimeno (2002) point out, in practice, not much changed: employers continued to hire workers under
temporary contracts for all type of jobs —and not only for seasonal jobs—, and judges did not change
their behaviour when appraising dismissals, despite the new regulations, i.e. dismissals under ’economic
reasons’ continued to be granted mainly when there was agreement between employers and workers, so
labour courts continued to rule most dismissals as unfair.
6Workers can be dismissed on disciplinary grounds, due to improper individual behaviour, such as
misconduct or unjustified absenteeism, or objective grounds, related to economic, technical or organisa-
tional reasons. If a dismissal is found to be unfair, a Labour Court can order the employer to re-instate
an employee with immediate effect, or alternatively to pay her a compensation payment based on the
length of service with the employer. The 1997 Reform substantially reduced such compensation payment.
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and payroll taxes fell between 40% and 90% for new permanent contracts of workers
younger than 30 years old, over 45 years old, the long-term unemployed, long-term un-
employed women who entered under-represented occupations, and disabled workers. We
only exploit the differential treatment by age group, since the long-term unemployed and
women under-represented in their occupations received treatment irrespective of their
age, and disabled workers are a very distinct group which deserves a separate analysis. In
particular, we study newly signed permanent contracts from unemployment. Conversions
of temporary to permanent contracts after the second quarter of 1997 were also promoted
with reductions in dismissal costs and payroll taxes for some population groups —see
Appendix Table 14. However, since the reductions were very similar across age groups,
identification of the effects becomes less clear-cut and therefore we will not use this group
either. Furthermore, unemployment is the main source of entry into permanent employ-
ment –as many as 75 per cent of all new permanent contracts come from unemployment–,
while conversions from temporary employment are a much smaller share of new perma-
nent hirings. Table 1 shows the principal changes in key provisions introduced by the 1997
reform for the younger and older workers. Severance payment for targeted groups were
reduced from 45 to 33 days’ wages per year of seniority and the maximum time period
was reduced by half, from 24 to 12 months. Reductions in payroll tax differ by age group;
they fall by 60% and 40% for older and younger unemployed individuals, respectively for
a period of 24 months. After the first 24 months, a lower payroll tax reduction of 50% is
extended indefinitely only for individuals over 45 years of age.
Not all firms could use Permanent Employment Promotion (PEP) contracts to hire
new permanent workers after the reform, and thus benefit from the reduction in firing costs
and payroll taxes introduced by the reform. Firms that dismissed workers for ’objective’
reasons but that were proved wrong in court or that engaged in collective dismissals
over the 12 moths prior to the reform, could not use PEP contracts when signing new
permanent contracts. To take due account of this, our sample selects only newly signed
PEP contracts (see Section 5). Furthermore, we will use the sample of newly signed
permanent contracts that do not use PEP contracts as control group in an alternative
identification strategy, in order to check the robustness of our findings (see Section 6.1.5).
Social security contribution rebates decreased slightly for newly signed contracts in
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Table 1: Principal Changes in Dismissal Cost and Payroll Tax for Unfair Dis-
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1999 and these changes were eventually extended in 2001.7 These further changes in
provisions, though minor, will condition our sample period to one year before and after
the reform, i.e. 1996 and 1998 (see Section 4).
3 A theoretical framework
In order to analyze the wage effects of the 1997 reform, this section uses the matching
model with heterogeneous workers put forth by Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2007) with
two extensions.8 First, we illustrate the joint effects of payroll taxes and firing costs
on wages. Second, since the reform basically targets the entry wage of two groups of
workers (less than 30 years and more than 45 years old, respectively), we consider a
different wage bargaining process for new entrants than for incumbents workers. This
7In particular, payroll taxes were reduced 35% in the first year and 25% in the second year for
newly hired young unemployed workers under permanent contract, while reductions for older unemployed
workers were 45% for the first year and 40% for the second one. Dismissal costs, however, did not change
in 1999. The 2001 reform applied lower payroll tax reductions and did not modify dismissal costs.
8Although the reform targeted age-worker groups, we do not include a complete life-cycle model
because this reform had a limited duration of two years. Thus, we only analyze its short-run impact on
wages.
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distinction is relevant because the firm does not incur in firing costs when the firm and
the worker do not agree on a wage in the first encounter since a contract has not been
signed yet. This second assumption permits deliver theoretical predictions specific to the
entry wage, which is the main dependent variable of the micro estimates. Finally, to avoid
capturing the effects of a different reform introduced in 1999, and thus be consistent with
our empirical estimations, we consider a model where the 1997 reform only modified the
non-wage labour costs of new hired workers with permanent contract and keep unchanged
the firing costs and payroll taxes of incumbent employees.
This labour market consists of a measure 1 of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived workers
and a continuum of risk-neutral, infinitely-lived firms. Workers and firms discount future
payoffs at a common rate δ and capital markets are perfect. In addition, time is discrete.
There are three type of workers, young (y), middle-age (m) and elderly (e) workers
who can be either unemployed or employed. The employed can be either new entrants or
incumbents. Thus, there are six type of employed workers who earn wj0t and w
j
t , where
subscript 0 indicates new entrants and superscript j = y,m, e denotes the age-group of
workers. There is a time-consuming and costly process of meeting unemployed workers
and job vacancies. As in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we assume that the







, ϕ > 0, (1)
where ut denotes the unemployment and vt are vacancies. This constant-return-to-
scale matching function ensures that ratios M(ut, vt)/ut and M(ut, vt)/vt lie between 0
and 1. Due to the CRS assumption they only depend on the vacancy-unemployment
ratio θt. The former represents the probability at which unemployed workers meet jobs,
f(θt) = M(1, 1/θt). Similarly, the latter denotes the probability at which vacancies meet




t/ut of each type of
workers looking for jobs.
Firms have a production technology that uses only labour. Each firm consists of only
one type of job which is either filled or vacant. Before a position is filled, the firm has to
open a job vacancy with cost c per period. A firm’s output depends on aggregate worker’s
productivity Ajt and a match-specific term zt. The match-specific productivity term zt
9
is assumed to be independent and identically distributed across firms and time, with a
cumulative distribution function G(z) and support [0, z¯].
Every period, a proportion φj of each type of employed worker separate exogenously
from the employment status and flow into the unemployment pool. Firms may voluntarily
terminate employment relationships, for which they may incur in a firing cost. In partic-
ular, firms lose γj0 or γ
j when a match with a new entrant or and incumbent worker is
destroyed by the firm, respectively.9 In both cases, a proportion ψ of this cost is assumed
to be a transfer to the worker in form of severance payment whereas the rest (1 − ψ) is
assumed to be fully wasted, reflecting firing restrictions imposed by the government.10
The second policy parameter is the wage payroll tax to be paid by the firm, which is τ j0
and τ j for new entrant and incumbent positions, respectively.
The equations characterizing the value of vacancies, Vt, and filled positions for new
















Jm0t+1(z)dG(z) + [1− q(θt)(1−G(z˜m0t+1))]Vt+1
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, (2)
J j0t(zt) = A
j










J jt (zt) = A
j










where z˜j0t+1 and z˜
j
t+1, j = {y,m, e}, are match-specific productivity thresholds, defined
such that nonprofitable matches (i.e., with negative surplus) are severed. These thresholds
9In this section, we assume that firing costs are constant along the duration of the contract. In the
calibration exercise, however, we will assume that severance payments change with the average duration
of the job position.
10We introduce the wasted firing costs component to avoid the ’bonding critique’ (Lazear, 1990).
Therefore, our model allows the presence of employment effects after the reform.
11For exposition reasons, we omit writing the aggregate state variables {At, θt} as arguments of these
value functions.
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or reservation productivities must satisfy the following conditions:
J j0t(z˜
j
0t)− Vt = 0, (5)
J jt (z˜
j
t )− Vt + γj = 0. (6)
Expression (5) defines the reservation productivity associated to the hiring process of
unemployed workers who meet a vacant job. Note that in this case the firm is not entailed
to γj0 in the absence of agreement since the job has not been created yet. In turn, (6)
defines the reservation productivity for job destruction of incumbent positions. In this
case, firing costs γj are operational.
It follows that each type of worker separate and find jobs with probabilities,
sjt = φ
j + (1− φj)G(z˜jt ), (7)
χjt = f(θt−1)(1−G(z˜j0t)). (8)
On the workers’ side, each type of unemployed worker gets bj units of the consumption
good each period, which could be understood as the value of leisure, home production, or
unemployment benefit. The values of the different statuses –unemployed, U jt , new hired
W j0t(zt) or incumbent, W
j
t (zt)– are given by the following expressions:






W j0t+1(z)dG(z) + [1− f(θt)(1−G(z˜j0t+1))]Ut+1
]
, (9)















+ δφjU jt+1, (10)
W jt (zt) = w
j









U jt+1 + ψγ
j
))]
+ δφjU jt+1. (11)
To close the model, we need first to incorporate two additional assumptions. One is
the free entry condition for vacancies: firms will open vacancies until the expected value
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of doing so becomes zero. Therefore, in equilibrium we must have
Vt = 0. (12)
The other assumption is that wages are set through Nash bargaining. The Nash
solution is the wage that maximizes the weighted product of the worker’s and firm’s net
return from the job match. It is known that this form of wage bargaining produces
flexible wages. We decide to adopt it because the relevant wages for the reform are wages
of newly hired workers with permanent contracts. Along this line, recent evidence by
Haefke, Sonntag, and van Rens (2009) and Pissarides (2009) suggest that wages in new
jobs display similar variability than the one obtained from a Nash wage equation in the
search model. Moreover, using also the Spanish Social Security data, De la Roca (2008)
also finds that wages of newly hired workers are substantially more volatile than those of
ongoing employees.12
The first-order conditions for new and incumbent employees yield the following con-
ditions,
(1− β)(1 + τ j0 )(W j0t(zt)− U jt ) = β(J j0t(zt)− Vt), (13)
(1− β)(1 + τ j)(W jt (zt)− U jt − ψγj) = β(J jt (zt)− Vt + γj). (14)
Note that the Nash condition for the incumbents displays two extra terms depending
on γj. Since separation costs are operational in continuing jobs, they are explicitly consid-
ered in the wage negotiation. This implies that the firm’s threat point when negotiating
with an incumbent is no longer the value of a vacancy Vt, but (V − γj); and that the
worker’s threat point depends on the proportion of firing costs (ψ) obtained in case of
disagreement. In the case of new entrants, the term γj0 does not appear in condition (13)
because the firm does not have to pay it if the new job position is not finally created.
Defining the total surplus for new and incumbent jobs as,




0t(zt)− U j0t) + (J j0t(zt)− Vt), (15)
Sjt (zt) = (1 + τ
j)(W jt (zt)− U jt − ψγj) + (J jt (zt)− Vt + γj), (16)
12To check the robustness of our results, we also include a simulated scenario with wage rigidity in
ongoing jobs.
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and using (2)-(14), the equilibrium wage equation for new entrants and incumbents are
wj0t(zt) = (1− β)bj −
(
1− φj) δ (1− β)ψγj0 − β





(1 + τ j0 )
[






wjt (zt) = (1− β)bj +
[
1− (1− φj)] δ (1− β)ψγj + β
(1 + τ j)
[
1− (1− φj)] δγj
+
β
(1 + τ j)
[









tzt − (1 + τ j0 )bj − δ
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According to equation (17), it is immediate to see that firing costs in new permanent
contracts, γj0, decrease the wages of new hired workers. This result takes place because,
although these costs are not operational at the entry level jobs, firms can translate part
of them to the new entry positions, reducing the workers ‘implicit’ bargaining power.13
Notice that the higher the proportion of severance payments in total firing costs ψ, the
larger the negative effect of firing costs on wj0t. In contrast, the effect of payroll taxes, τ
j
0 ,
on entry wages is not clear since the right hand side element in equation (17) interacting
with firing costs increases with τ j0 , while the one not interacting with γ
j
0 decreases with
payroll taxes in new hired positions.
Wages in incumbent jobs are also affected by γj0 and τ
j
0 . In this case, the reform affects
the future surplus of incumbent workers moving to a new job position, Sj0t+1. According
to equation (19), γj0 decreases the future surplus in new positions and, therefore, the wage
of incumbent workers (18). Since incumbent workers know that entry wages decrease with
γj0 , they are more willing to reduce their current wage to decrease the probability of being
separated from the firm. As for new entrants, the effect of τ j0 on incumbent wages w
j
t is
not clear since there are two terms in Sj0t that go in opposite directions.
In sum, according to our theoretical model the overall wage effect of the 1997 reform on
13Notice that this result implies that new hired workers in permanent positions earn, on average, less
than incumbent workers, which is consistent with our own wage gap estimates across age groups, which
range from 26% to 40%.
13
both new entrants and incumbent wages is not clear and it is thus entirely an empirical
question. On the one hand, the reduction in firing costs in new created job positions,




t . On the other hand, the reduction in payroll taxes
generates an unclear effect on both type of wages.
To fully characterize the dynamics of this economy, we need to define the law of motion
for unemployment and the mass of employed workers (ujt and n
j
t). These evolve according



























1 = ut + nt, (24)
4 Identification strategy
In order to identify the impact of dismissal costs and payroll taxes on wages, we compare
the change in mean wages of young and older employees holding a permanent contract in
the current spell and who were unemployed in the previous spell before and after the 1997
reform, with the change in mean wages of prime age workers who got a permanent job
from unemployment. That is, we exploit the variation over time and across age groups
and use a difference-in-differences estimator. The identifying assumption requires that
the difference between wages of treatment and control groups would not change in the
absence of the reform. More formally,
E{w˜Tpre} − E{w˜Cpre} = E{w˜Tpost} − E{w˜Cpost}
where w˜ is the counterfactual wage in absence of the reform, superscript j = T,C indicates
treatment or control group and subscripts pre and post refer to pre- and post-reform
periods.
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In the empirical analysis, we identify the average effect of the reform on wages as:
βDID = (E{wTpost} − E{wTpre})− (E{wCpost} − E{wCpre}) (25)
where w is actual wages. The identification strategy is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots
average wages for men and women by age group relative to the second quarter of 1997,
for the years before and after the reform, i.e. 1995 to 1999. Figure 1 shows a marked
change in the growth rate of average wages of the treatment groups, after the reform.
That is, after the second quarter of 1997 average wages of younger and older workers
increase much faster than those of the control group, and the increase is larger for men
and for the older age group. The graphical evidence of Figure 1 thus hints clearly at a
strong and clear effect of the reform.
We estimate the effect of the reform on wages with the following wage equation:
Wit = α0 + α1Dt + α2Di + β
′
Di ×Dt +X ′γ + it (26)
where Wit is the log of average gross monthly earnings for those who transit from
unemployment to permanent contract, Di is a vector of dummies for treated groups (i.e.
workers who make a transition to permanent employment from unemployment and are
aged less than 30 or older than 45 years)14 and Dt is a vector of dummies that identify
the post-reform years. The vector X includes time-varying covariates such as professional
category, experience, industry, whether working full- or part-time, private or public sector
job, firmsize in the current and previous job spells, regional effects, type of contract in
the previous job spell, number of permanent contract held previously, having received
unemployment benefits in the last unemployment spell, and duration of the last unem-
ployment spell. The coefficients of interest in this regression are the βs, which represent
the treatment effects; that is, capture the effects of the reform on wages in the years after
the reform.
Our strategy assumes that employers do not substitute workers not affected by the
reform for targeted workers. However, if the change in provisions brought about by
the reform is perceived as beneficial by employers, they will tend to substitute non-
14The excluded category is then the control group, which comprises workers aged 30 to 45 who transit
from unemployment to permanent employment.
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Figure 1: Wage trend for treated and control groups in our sample












































































men 20-29 men 30-44 men 45-60








































































Women 20-29 Women 30-44 Women 45-64
Source: MCVL, own calculations.
targeted workers (our control group) for targeted workers (our treatment group) who are
otherwise deemed similar. To see whether the assumption holds, Table 2 presents pre- and
post-reform employment probabilities for individuals with ages adjacent to the relevant
age thresholds, i.e. 30 and 45 years. If employers substituted workers, pre- and post-
reform employment probabilities for control group workers would fall. Table 2 shows that
employment probabilities for these workers do not change significantly, which suggests
that the possible substitution of workers is not likely to affect our results. To further
check whether substitution is a problem we estimated the effects on employment of the
reform with the sample restricted to workers with ages close to the policy thresholds, i.e.
16
tratment groups include only workers aged 27 to 29 and 45 to 47, and the control group
includes only workers aged 30 to 32 and 42 to 44. If substitution took place then we
would find larger effects in the restricted sample. Results of these regressions, presented
in Cervini Pla´, Ramos, and Silva (2010), show that this is not the case: the effects of the
reform on employment probabilities estimated with the restricted sample are quite similar
to (and usually slightly smaller than) the effects obtained with the whole sample.15
Table 2: Pre- and Post-reform employment probabilities for a restricted sample
Men Women
Age Pre-reform Post-reform Pre-reform Post-reform
27 70.1% 76.0% 44.9% 49.1%
28 72.3% 79.2% 45.5% 50.1%
29 75.8% 80.7% 47.6% 52.1%
30 77.6% 81.5% 50.2% 52.3%
31 78.3% 83.0% 52.9% 55.7%
32 78.4% 83.1% 53.2% 57.2%
42 79.1% 80.3% 41.2% 46.7%
43 80.1% 81.5% 41.3% 46.8%
44 82.3% 81.2% 42.6% 48.2%
45 83.1% 86.4% 43.8% 50.4%
46 83.5% 86.8% 45.3% 52.3%
47 84.6% 87.2% 46.1% 53.5%
Table 2 also shows that employment increases in treated groups after the reform.16
Workers who were hired because of the reform but who would had not been hired other-
wise, are likely to be lower productivity workers and thus earn lower wages. We expect
this selection to play against our results and introduce a downward bias. Hence, our
estimates may be interpreted as a lower bound estimate of the true effects.
15The only exception is the unemployment to permanent employment transition probability of older
women.
16Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002) reach the same conclusion when examining the employment
effects of the reform with data from the Labour Force Survey. Section 6.1.2 also reports positive employ-
ment effects of the reform for our sample.
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5 Data and methodological decisions
We employ a unique administrative dataset with Social Security records called Continuous
Sample of Job Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL) for the years 2004
to 2012, which consist of a random sample of 4% of all affiliated workers, working or not,
and pensioners from the Social Security archives. This dataset contains detailed job-
related information on the complete job history of of 1,692,308 individuals, which include
labour market status and type of contract for each and every job spell.17 The MCVL
is very rich and detailed as regards job histories, and it also has information on basic
individual characteristics, such as sex, education and age, which come from municipal
registries (padrones).
Our sample selection is as follows. First, we study men and women aged between
21-60 to select out the two ends of the labour career. Second, we drop the long-term
unemployed18 and disabled workers, since they all received treatment irrespective of their
age. Third, we drop incomplete or incorrect registers. Fourth, we consider workers who
are in the general scheme (Regimen General) when making the relevant transition from
unemployment to permanent employment, which includes 90 per cent of all workers.19
Fifth, as outlined in Section 2 not all firms could use Permanent Employment Promotion
contracts to hire new permanent workers after the reform. Since the MCVL has informa-
tion on the exact contract of the worker, we employ only PEP contracts in the analysis,
which covers 78.3% of newly signed permanent contracts from unemployment for workers
younger than 30 and older than 45 in 1998. To avoid capturing the effects of the 1999
reform, we compare the year prior to the reform (1996) with the year after the reform
(1998). Sensitivity checks are performed with slightly wider time windows (i.e.1995-1996
and 1998-1999), but results do not change substantially (see Appendix Table 15).
The wage measure is the log of average gross monthly wage or salary, deflated by the
17Since the dataset contains information also on pensioners, we do not face attrition problems due, for
instance, to the larger likelihood of workers with poorer employment performance and lower wages to
exit the labour market sooner.
18Long-term unemployment includes unemployed with unemployment spells longer than 12 months.
19We thus only exclude workers in self-employment, agriculture, fishing and other minor special cases,
when making the relevant transition. When not making the relevant transition, the above types of
workers are included in the analysis. Using workers who are in the general regime is common practice in
the few studies that use the MCVL (e.g. Garc´ıa-Pe´rez and Rebollo-Sanz (2009)) and is also the choice
of Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002) when studying the employment effects of the reform using the
Spanish Labour Force Survey.
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consumer price index. As it often occurs with Social Security records, wages in the MCVL
are top- and bottom-coded, that is, they are censored. Although for the entire sample this
is a significant problem (Bonhomme and Hospido (2009)), such an issue is likely not to
be empirically relevant in our case as wages are censored only for very few observations.20
Tables 3 and 4 provide summary statistics for the period before and after the 1997
reform by relevant age groups of our sample, and for men and women separately.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group, Pre- and Post-Reform for Men
Variable Age<30 Age 30-45 Age>45
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Wages 1114.67 1376.65 1384.56 1436.89 1465.23 1628.33
Log wages 7.02 7.23 7.23 7.27 7.29 7.40
Age 25.11 25.16 36.06 36.26 51.70 51.60
% Unskilled jobs 69.35 64.58 60.93 58.25 62.67 62.25
% Semi-skilled workers and semi-skilled clerks 23.51 25.65 24.13 23.48 20.57 19.77
% Engineers and graduates, chief and dep. heads 7.15 9.76 14.94 18.27 16.76 17.98
Unemployment spells 6.90 6.42 12.51 12.93 15.68 14.49
Experience (in days) 1445.79 1301.61 4257.29 4328.89 7661.83 7941.70
N 4,928 5,975 5,175 5,301 1,780 2,745
The matched MCVL has important advantages over other data sets which have been
employed in previous studies. For instance, as compared with the Spanish Labour Force
Survey (Encuesta de Poblacio´n Activa, EPA), used by Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz
(2002) to examine the effects of the reform on employment, the MCVL contains infor-
mation on wages for each job spell, which allows us to examine the effects on wages, for
first time. Secondly, the MCVL provides information on each and every single job spell
and not only at the time of the interview, as typically occurs with other large and rep-
resentative surveys such as the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), the EU
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), or the Labour Force Surveys, which
20There are hardly any bottom-coded observations in our sample, while top-coded wages represent
between 0.16% and 0.85% of the sample, depending on the year and age/gender group. Such small
incidence is likely to be due to the fact that individuals in our sample have experienced a recent spell
of unemployment, so their wages are less likely to be affected by top-coding. Nonetheless, we have also
estimated our main parameters of interest of Table 5 with censored models and have found very similar
results. Top-coding is more prevalent among incumbent workers, see Section 6.1.4.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics by Age Group, Pre- and Post-Reform for Women
Variable Age<30 Age 30-45 Age>45
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Wages 1006.89 1173.78 1223.17 1256.41 1141.87 1322.70
Log wages 6.91 7.07 7.11 7.14 7.04 7.19
Age 25.04 25.17 36.25 36.36 51.58 51.31
% Unskilled jobs 44.99 40.13 52.97 52.65 74.21 72.01
% Semi-skilled workers and semi-skilled clerks 47.14 50.38 32.89 32.42 20.99 21.26
% Engineers and graduates, chief and dep. heads 7.87 9.49 14.14 14.94 4.80 6.73
Unemployment spells 7.13 6.41 19.46 19.58 24.26 23.84
Experience (in days) 1199.82 1146.18 3292.83 3354.17 3702.48 4272.64
N 1,719 3,127 3,904 4,763 1,620 3,238
eliminates the possibility of aggregation bias. The time-span of the MCVL, however, is
not long enough as to cover more than one economic cycle, and thus cycle effects cannot
be taken account of in the empirical analysis.
6 Wage Effects of the 1997 Reform
As pointed out in the Introduction, we present two sets of complementary evidence on
the effects of the 1997 reform. We first present microeconometric estimates (Section 6.1)
and then evidence which results from calibrating and simulating the model of Section
3 (Section 6.2). Difference-in-differences estimates will yield results for newly hired and
incumbent workers,21 men and women separately, while results from simulations provide
effects on average wages across gender. Simulations will also allow us to calculate the
separate effect of dismissal costs and payroll taxes.
6.1 Micreconometric estimates
Table 5 reports the estimates of interest of the wage equation (26), for men and women
separately. The effect of the reform on wages is captured by the coefficients β on the
interaction (Di×Dt), which is positive and statistically significant for the two treatment
21Incumbent workers are those hired before the reform.
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groups and both genders. This means that the reduction in dismissal costs and payroll
taxes results in a sizeable wage increase for the two treated groups as compared to the
control group. The increase is larger for the older group than for the younger one and
smaller for women than for men. More precisely, we find a 6.5% wage increase for young
unemployed men transiting to a permanent contract; the increase for women of the same
age is lower (4.5%). For the older unemployed workers doing the same transition, wages
increased 9.4% and 7.7% for men and women, respectively.22 The larger effect on wages for
the older group may reflect the somewhat larger reduction in firing costs, which applied to
this age group (see Table 1), as according to the simulations of our model shown in Section
6.2.2, the reduction in firing costs accounts for over 60% of the overall wage increase of
new entrants. Likewise, it is reasonable to find larger wage effects for the older group
irrespective of the gender, as changes in both firing costs and payroll taxes are the same
across gender groups.
Table 5: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. OLS estimation
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age<30 0.047 1.72 0.036 1.12
Age>45 -0.024 -0.66 0.127 2.91
Post 1997 0.079 4.47 0.075 3.63
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.065 2.66 0.045 3.43
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.094 2.85 0.077 2.07
N 25,904 18,371
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years.
Controls have the expected sign. For instance, experience, working full-time, in the
private sector or firmsize shows a positive effect on wages, while the duration of the
last unemployment spell has a negative influence on wages. Full estimates of the wage
regressions are shown in Appendix Table 16.
These estimates are unbiased for the group of workers who go from unemployment
22Recall that long-term unemployed and disabled workers were dropped from the sample because all
individuals belonging to these two groups receive treatment irrespective of their age.
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to permanent employment, and thus are relevant to assess the effect on wages of policies
which seek to promote employment by changing employment protection legislation pro-
visions, which is normaly the case. Notice, however, that since there may be selection
into treatment, the estimates of Table 5 may be biased if applied to the whole active
population. The next section addresses such selection.
6.1.1 Selection into treatment
We only observe wages of the unemployed who obtain a permanent job, and these may
differ in important unmeasured ways from the unemployed that are not hired with a
permanent contract. The latter are arguably less productive, have lower bargaining power
and thus earn lower wages. This selection, thus, may introduce an upward bias. We take
account of this sample selection problem with a two-step Heckman type correction, and
identify the first step (i.e. the probability of making a transition to permanent employment
from unemployment) with the number of unemployment spells prior to the transition into
permanent employment. It is difficult to find a convincing exclusion restriction for our
case and this is the best option available in our data set. We thus assume that the
number of previous unemployment spells affects the probability of getting a permanent
job from unemployment but that conditional on selection it does not affect wages. There
is a substantial amount of evidence of state dependence scarring effects in individual
unemployment histories (see Arulampalam, Booth, and Taylor (2000), Biewen and Steffes
(2010), Rebollo-Sanz (2011) and Ayllo´n (2013) for recent studies for Spain), which should
explain a negative effect of the number of unemployment spells on the probability of
finding permanent employment. It may be argued, that our exclusion restriction captures
in part unobserved productivity and it is thus correlated with wages. We however contend
that this is less likely to occur in our case, as our empirical analysis uses entry wages.
Importantly, our exclusion restriction does not correlate with entry wages, when it is
included in our baseline wage equation (26).23 Moreover, our exclusion restriction is not
correlated with the duration of the last unemployment spell, a variable which is often
used to capture unobserved productivity.24 We thus expect that conditional on selection,
23Our exclusion restriction, i.e. the number of previous unemployment spells, is neither statistically
significant (p-value of 0.45 for men and 0.68 for women) nor economically important (point estimate very
close to zero, i.e. -0.005, for men, and -0.002 for women).
24The correlation coeffcient between number of unemployment spells and the duration of the last
unemployment spell is 0.037 and 0.032 for men and women, respectively.
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unobserved productivity does not affect entry wages much –and certaintly much less than
longer-term wages.
We use a probit model for the first stage of the Heckman procedure,
Pr[eit = 1|Xit] = Φ[µo + µ1Dt + µ2Di + θ′Di ×Dt +X ′ϑ+ Z ′η] (27)
where eit = 1 if individual i transits from unemployment to permanent employment
and eit = 0 otherwise. Z is the exclusion restriction, that is, the number of unemployment
spells prior to the transition.
Table 6 shows the estimates of interest for the selection and the wage equations. For
men, selection into the relevant transition from unemployment to permanent employment
is negative, i.e. unobservables are negatively correlated with both doing the transition
and wages, and the coefficient of the number of unemployment spells η, which identifies
selection into the relevant transition, is negative and statistically significant –see Appendix
Table 17 for the full set of estimates of the wage and selection regressions. Selection is
positive for women, however, which introduces a downward bias.25 Such positive selection
is entirely driven by low skilled older women, i.e. selection is negative for younger women
and intermediate and high skilled older women, as it is for men.26
Once we correct for selection, the wage effects of the reform are not much different from
those reported in the previous section, and because of the negative selection for men and
the positive selection for women, the wage effects of the reform converge between genders.
The reform brings about a wage increase of 6.0% and 4.7% for young men and women,
respectively, and an increase of 8.8% and 7.7% for older male and female workers,27 which
are statistically significant according the the corrected standard errors. That is, as we
pressumed, the selection brings about a slight upward bias for men and a slight downward
bias for women.
To check the robustness of our estimates of interest to different exclusion restrictions,
25This is also the case when we extend the sample period to include two years around the reform date.
26We have estimated the two-stage Heckman procedure for each professional category separately and
found selection to be positive only for low skilled older women. Results are available from the authors
upon request.
27Since the two treatment variables appear in both the selection and outcome equations, the marginal
effects (and their standard errors) are not simply given by the second stage estimates reported in the
upper panel of Table 6. Instead, they are given by two components, the direct effect of the reform on
wages of those making the transition from unemployment to permanent employment and the indirect
effect through an increased probability of making the transition (see Greene (2008), p. 885).
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Table 6: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. Heckman selection model (two stage
method)
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
1. WAGE EFFECTS
Uncorrected wage effects (wage equation)
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.059 2.39 0.049 3.44
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.088 2.65 0.080 2.08
N 25,904 18,371
Selection coefficients




(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.060 10.41 0.047 5.38
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.088 15.37 0.077 8.85
2. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
Employment effects (selection equation)
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.079 4.72 0.064 3.19
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.119 4.95 0.083 4.40
Spells -0.063 -108.34 -0.051 -79.42
N 277,394 181,432
Marginal prob. of emp. effects at the mean
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.009 3.71 0.011 3.15
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.014 4.30 0.013 3.16
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. ρ is the correlation
between error terms of the wage and selection equation. σ is the standard error of
the residual in the wage equation.
*Since the two treatment variables appear in both the outcome and selection equa-
tions, the marginal effects and their standard errors are not simply given by the
second stage estimates reported in the upper panel (see footnote 27).
we run the two-step Heckman procedure with two alternative exclusion restrictions: the
type of contract held in the previous job spell and the number of permanent contracts
held previously. The results shown in Appendix Table 18 indicate that when using these
24
two alternative exclusion restrictions, there is no sample selection, as the statistically
insignificant inverse Mills’ ratio suggest. With no sample selection, then, our estimates
are robust to using different exclusion restrictions.
6.1.2 Employment effects
A thorough analysis of the employment effects of the reform is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, since the reform was meant to improve the permanent employment
prospects of certain population groups, it is interesting to examine its employment effects.
As we want to analyse the transition probability from unemployment to a permanent
contract, we use duration models and estimate a specification with the same controls as
the selection model in equation (27). This model shall provide a first insight into the
employment effects of the reform. Table 7 reports the estimated hazard ratios of interest
from a Cox proportional hazards model. In line with previous studies (e.g. Kugler,
Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002)), our findings reveal that the reform has large, positive and
significant permanent employment effects for the sample of new permanent hires with
PEP contract. Such effects are slightly larger for younger than for older male workers –for
whom permanent employment probabilies increase by 22 and 16 per cent, respectively–,
and about the same for younger and older female workers –whose permanent employment
probability increases by 18 per cent.
Table 7: Effects of the Reform on Employment. Hazard ratios of interest from a Cox
proportional hazards model
Men Women
Hazard Rates t-stat Hazard Rate t-stat
Age<30 1.057 1.66 0.991 -0.23
Age>45 1.118 2.60 1.451 6.90
Post 1997 0.791 -11.23 0.901 -4.05
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 1.219 6.73 1.177 4.49
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 1.160 3.81 1.179 4.37
N 277,394 181,432
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years.
As expected, the reform has no permanent employment effects for the sample of new
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permanent hires with no PEP contract, as the interaction terms between the trated groups
and the post reform dummy are not statistically significant (not shown).
6.1.3 Who benefits more? Heterogeneous effects of the Reform
As Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2007) and the model in Section 3 suggests, the change in
payroll taxes and firing costs brought about by the Reform is likely to have heterogenous
effects possibly stemming from differences in the bargaining positions of workers vis-a`-vis
employers. Heterogeneous effects are estimated by interacting the variable that proxies the
bargaining position of workers, and that will cause the heterogeneity, with the interaction









where Hi is the variable that causes heterogeneous effects, and thus ϕ is our parameter
of interest, capturing the heterogeneity brought about by the different bargaining position
of workers.
In order to examine whether individuals with different bargaining power experienced
different wage changes from the Reform, we employ three observable variables to proxy
the bargaining position of workers: professional category, whether working in the private
or public sector, and earned wage.28
Professional category Arguably higher professional category workers will have more
bargaining power –recall also that given the unreliability of the education variable in our
data set, professional category is often used in previous studies as proxy for education
attainment. The upper panel of Table 8 shows that indeed this is the case, for both
men and women. For instance, because of the reform, unskilled young male workers (the
reference category) experience a wage increase of 5.9%, while semi-skilled young male
workers have a wage increase of 7.2% (i.e. 5.9+1.3), and engineers and graduates young
male workers see their wages increase by 8.1%.
28Other recent studies have used similar observables, such as white or blue collar, and the age group of
the worker –that we cannot use for obvious reasons– to proxy the bargaining position of workers (Leonardi
and Pica (2014)).
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Private or public sector The second manner we have to proxy the bargaining position
of workers is to distinguish those who work in the private sector from those in the public
sector. Wage setting in public sector employment in Spain is more rigid and more subject
to regulations than in the private sector. Hence, we expect private sector employees to
have a better bargaining position than public sector employees, and to benefit more from
the Reform. The second panel of Table 8 shows that this is the case, for both men and
women. Because of the Reform, young male (female) workers in the private sector earn
2.7% (1.4%) higher wages than their counterpart workers in the public sector (reference
category), while older male (female) workers earn 3.2% (2.9%) more in the private sector
than in the public sector.
Wages Finally we also estimate the coefficient of the interaction term ϕ at different
quantiles of the wage distribution. Since workers earning higher wages are likely to have
a better bargaining position, we expect ϕ to increase monotonically with the position of
the worker in the wage distribution. The bottom panel of Table 8 shows estimates of
ϕ at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles from quantile regressions. Results
show that the positive effect of the Reform increases with the position of the worker in
the wage distribution. Differences across the wage distribution are substantial. The effect
of the reform is 4 times larger for a young male worker at the 90th quantile of the wage
distribution than for a woker at the 10th quantile; such difference is a bit smaller for older
male workers (a factor of 3.5). Differences for younger women are larger than for younger
men. The effect of the reform on younger female workers at the 10th quantile is about 5.5
times larger than those at the 90th quantile, while it is 3.2 times larger for older women.
6.1.4 Effect on incumbents
Even thought the reform did not target incumbent workers, i.e. those hired before the
reform, our model suggests that their wages may be also affected by the reform. Accord-
ing to our thoretical model, once incumbent employees know that wages of new entrant
positions are higher than before the reform, they use their bargaining power and negotiate
an increment in their wages. Moreover, the reform also reduces unemployment rates for
younger and older incumbent workers, increasing their bargaining power. We empirically
test the wage effects by estimating the wage equation (26) on incumbent workers, as we
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Table 8: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. Heterogeneous effects. OLS estimates
Men Women
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
1. PROFESSIONAL CATEGORY
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.059 3.91 0.043 4.04
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.074 3.77 0.058 4.24
(Age<30)*(Post 1997)*(Semi-skilled workers) 0.013 4.05 0.011 5.18
(Age<30)*(Post 1997)*(Engineers and graduates) 0.022 4.27 0.024 5.15
(Age>45)*(Post 1997)*(Semi-skilled workers) 0.017 4.21 0.014 5.15
(Age>45)*(Post 1997)*(Engineers and graduates) 0.047 4.53 0.028 5.18
2. PRIVATE SECTOR
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.052 3.61 0.047 3.42
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.079 3.75 0.062 3.59
(Age<30)*(Post 1997)*(Private) 0.027 4.31 0.014 3.84
(Age>45)*(Post 1997)*(Private) 0.032 4.29 0.029 3.40
3. QUANTILE EFFECTS
Quantiles
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.10 0.024 3.78 0.017 3.51
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.10 0.032 3.44 0.037 3.39
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.25 0.030 2.50 0.028 5.63
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.25 0.052 3.29 0.048 6.94
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.50 0.060 3.66 0.043 3.66
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.50 0.085 3.71 0.057 3.66
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.75 0.063 5.47 0.073 5.41
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.75 0.088 5.75 0.112 6.20
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.90 0.101 6.80 0.095 5.82
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.90 0.112 10.08 0.119 9.65
N 25,904 18,371
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. Reference categories:
Professional category (Unskilled jobs), Private (Work in the public sector)
can safely assume that there is little substitutability of workers across age categories –see
Table 2.
As pointed out in Section 5, observed wages of incumbent workers are censored. In
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particular, 8.1% of male wages and 4.7% of female wages in the sample of incumbents
are top-coded. In order to address the problem of censored wages we report estimates of
a Tobit model for the wage equation. Moreover, since our dataset has many job spells
for each incumbent worker, we now make use of the panel structure of the dataset and
estimate panel models, which allow us to control for unobserved individual heterogeneity.
Both fixed and random effect models yield simlar results.
Table 9: Effects of the Reform on Wages for the incumbents. Censored models with FE
estimation
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age<30 -0.018 -2.07 0.024 2.55
Age>45 0.021 2.66 0.046 4.14
Post 1997 0.020 3.10 0.123 3.60
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.018 3.83 0.020 3.60
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.025 3.73 0.026 3.52
N 203,053 114,897
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years.
In line with our model predictions, the Tobit fixed effect estimates shown in Table 9
suggest that incumbent workers also experience a modest wage increase due to the reform.
This increase is larger for older men and women (2.5% and 2.6%, respectively) than for
younger workers (1.8% and 2.0%). The full set of estimates are presented in Appendix
Table 19.
6.1.5 Robustness checks
To show the robustness of our key findings, this section presents the results of three
sensibility checks. In particular, we show that our results are robust to alternative iden-
tification stategies, to widening the time window around the year of the reform, and to
restricting the sample to ages around the policy thresholds.
An alternative identification strategy As outlined in Section 2, not all firms could
use Permanent Employment Promotion contracts to hire new permanent workers after the
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reform. Two circumstances precluded firms from using PEP contracts: dismissing workers
for ’objective’ reasons and having been proved wrong in court or engaging in collective
dismissals over the 12 moths prior to the reform. Unfortunately, our data do not contain
information on firms’ dismissals, and so we cannot check why the worker is not hired with
a PEP contract, but we have grounds to believe that the group of workers hired with no
PEP contract after the reform is not endogenous to the reform, and thus we can use it as
control group.
We presume that firms that dismissed and were proved wrong in court should not
behave differently from the pool of other firms, which includes firms that dismissed and
were not proved wrong in court and firms that did not dismiss over the 12 months prior
to the reform. As regards collective dismissals, very few workers (only 0.9 per cent,
according to official statistics) were affected by such dismissals. Therefore the sample of
workers with no PEP contracts should be exogenous to the reform. Our data supports this
premise. To start with, t and χ2 tests (not shown) reveal that workers with and without
PEP contracts have similar observable characteristics. Moreover, difference-in-differences
regressions (as in equation (26)) for the sample of workers with no PEP contract show
that the reform has no effect on this group of workers, which supports the validity of
our alternative identification strategy. Furthermore, the estimates of all the other control
variables are nearly identical to those obtained from the sample of workers with PEP
contracts (see Appendix Table 20).
Therefore, we can estimate the causal effect of the reform by simply comparing work-
ers with and without Permanent Employment Promotion contracts amongst the pool of
workers who entered permanent employment from unemployment after the reform. That
is, now our control group is the workers who got permanent employment from unemploy-
ment after the reform and were not hired with a PEP contract. To that end, we run a
regression similar to our baseline regression (26), for each age group and gender, where the
effect of the reform is estimated by a dummy variable that indicates whether the worker
holds a PEP contract. The estimation sample is now restricted to workers who obtained
a permanent job from unemployment after the reform.29 Tables 10 and 11 show that
29Selection into treatment could also be an issue here. However, the results from a Heckman selection
model (not shown, but available upon request) indicate that the sample does not suffer from selection
into treatment, as the inverse Mills’ ratio of the four regressions is not statistically significant. Thus
Tables 10 and 11 show simple OLS estimates.
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this alternative identification strategy yields reassuringly similar results as those obtained
when identification relies on age groups. Estimates are slightly smaller for younger men
(5.7 and 9.7 per cent, to be compared to the baseline estimates of 6.5 and 9.4 per cent, for
younger and older men respectively) and slightly larger for women (5.1 and 8.1 per cent,
instead of the baseline estimates of 4.5 and 7.7 per cent, for younger and older women
respectively).
Table 10: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. Alternative identification strategy:
compares workers with and with no Employment Promotion contract for those with less
than 30 years old. OLS estimates.
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Employment Promotion contract 0.057 3.31 0.051 3.78
Age 0.093 3.85 0.321 5.44
Age square -0.001 -3.40 -0.006 -4.98
Experience 0.0008 12.71 0.0001 10.20
Unemployment benefits 0.049 3.32 0.098 5.83
Full time 0.521 23.80 0.462 25.65
Firm size 0.0004 9.19 0.0001 2.91
Private 0.037 4.62 0.086 3.75
Duration last spell -0.0001 -4.48 -0.0003 -3.54
Previous firm size 3.68e-07 0.98 -4.54e-07 -1.01
Num. of perm. contracts -0.009 -23.88 -0.006 -12.75
(a) Previous type of contract
Permanent 0.235 10.23 0.183 7.05
Temporary -0.037 -2.32 -0.003 -0.17
(b)Profesional Category
Semi-skilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled clerks 0.143 10.00 0.227 15.05
Engineers and graduates, chief and departmental heads 0.410 19.70 0.594 23.24
(c)Industry
Industry. -0.062 -0.88 0.278 1.79
Construction -0.131 -1.84 0.271 1.67
Trade, Transport and Hotels 0.256 -3.67 0.165 1.06
Finance -0.247 -3.47 0.097 0.62
Public Administration -0.362 -6.88 0.149 0.95
(d)Region
Dummys included YES YES
N 10,734 7,256
Reference categories: Previous type of contract (no contract), Professional category (Unskilled jobs), In-
dustry (Agriculture)
Wider time windows To avoid capturing the effects of the 1999 reform, our baseline
regression compares the year prior to the reform (1996) with the year after the reform
(1998). Appendix Table 15 shows that results do not change when we slightly widen the
31
Table 11: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. Alternative identification strategy:
compares workers with and with no Employment Promotion contract for those with more
than 45 years old. OLS estimates.
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Employment Promotion contract 0.097 8.06 0.081 3.73
Age 0.057 1.02 -0.111 -1.50
Age square -0.0005 -1.05 0.0009 1.31
Experience 7.85e-06 2.36 0.0001 12.86
Unemployment benefits 0.138 6.98 0.014 0.45
Full time 0.748 14.60 0.601 17.82
Firm size 0.0001 3.65 0.0004 2.29
Private 0.055 5.44 0.081 4.19
Duration last spell -0.0003 -2.51 -0.0009 -6.96
Previous firm size 1.51e-07 0.35 6.66e-07 0.87
Num. of perm. contracts -0.003 -12.78 -0.003 -10.29
(a) Previous type of contract
Permanent 0.098 3.80 0.134 4.45
Temporary -0.042 -2.07 -0.012 -0.39
(b)Profesional Category
Semi-skilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled clerks 0.125 5.57 0.136 4.62
Engineers and graduates, chief and departmental heads 0.499 21.21 0.447 9.42
(c)Industry
Industry. 0.533 6.09 0.441 4.23
Construction 0.369 4.18 0.442 3.29
Trade, Transport and Hotels 0.204 2.35 0.445 4.46
Finance 0.387 4.24 0.436 4.18
Public Administration 0.057 0.62 0.451 4.30
(d)Region
Dummys included YES YES
N 5,278 3,025
Reference categories: Previous type of contract (no contract), Professional category (Unskilled jobs), In-
dustry (Agriculture)
time windows to years 1995-1996 and 1998-1999.30
Restrict the sample to ages around the policy thresholds Since our identification
strategy compares different age groups and the difference-in-differences estimator does not
impose common support on the distribution of the control variables, treated and control
groups might face different common supports. We address this problem by estimating
our baseline equation (26) on a restricted sample of workers with ages close to the policy
thresholds (i.e. 26-29, 30-33 and 40-44, 45-49). Appendix Table 21 corroborates the
positive effect of the reform on wages. Actually, the estimated effects of the reform for
30Results are also very similar to the baseline case, i.e. where only years 1996 and 1998 are used, when
we correct for endogenous selection into treatment by means of the two-stage Heckman procedure.
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the narrower and more homogeneous age groups are larger than the baseline estimates,
suggesting that the true effect of the reform might be larger than what our baseline
estimates suggest.
6.2 Calibration and simulated results of the model
In this section we quantify the impact in relative wages when only new hired workers
of each target group are assumed to be directly affected by the reform. To this end,
we first calibrate the model presented in section 3 at annual frequencies just before the
1997 labour market reform. Then we departure from the initial setup by reproducing the
observed reduction in firing costs and payroll taxes in the targeted age-groups during the
1997 reform. Finally, we analyze the simulated post reform effects on the level of wages of
each target group with respect to the non targeted group of workers (m). The simulated
results complement the estimated effects presented in section 6.1 by predicting not only
the impact on wages of newly hired workers, wj0, but also on wages of continuing workers
not directly affected by the reform, wj.
6.2.1 Benchmark calibration: Before the reform
Our benchmark parametrization must match the following targets in the steady state,
which are summarized in the upper part of Table 12. The first three targets consist of the
average unemployment rates for workers younger than 30 years old, uy = 35.1%, between
30 and 45 years old, um = 18.5%, and older than 45 years old, ue = 12.4%. Using
data from the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE), we apply Shimer (2005)’s
methodology to target an annual job finding rate of 0.547 for young workers, 0.427 for
middle age employees and 0.460 for older employees. We also target the average wage
differential among these groups, wy/wm = 0.777 and we/wm = 1.069. Finally, we target
the proportion of each type of workers looking for jobs. Therefore, λe = 0.166, λy = 0.486
and λm = 1− λe − λy.
With respect to the calibration of our parameters, we set the discount factor δ = 0.95,
which matches an annual real interest rate of nearly 5 percent observed in 1996. Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) identify an elasticity of unemployment with respect to the matching
function in the range 0.5-0.7. We take 0.6 as reference and thus set the matching parameter
ϕ at 0.879.
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Table 12: Benchmark Calibration. Spain, 1996
Value Source
Targets:
Unemployment rate (< than 30 years old) uy 0.351 [A]
Unemployment rate (between 30 and 45 years old) um 0.185 [A]
Unemployment rate (> than 45 years old) ue 0.124 [A]
Job finding rate > than 45 years old χe 0.460 [A]
Job finding rate between 30 and 45 years old χm 0.427 [A]
Job finding rate < than 30 years old χy 0.547 [A]








Workers looking for jobs(< than 30 years old) λy 0.486 [A]
Workers looking for jobs(> than 45 years old) λe 0.166 [A]
Parameters:
Aggregate labour productivity > than 45 years old Ae 1.00 Normalized
Aggregate labour productivity between 30 and 45 Am 1.116 [C]
Aggregate labour productivity < than 30 years old Ay 1.509 [C]
Mean of log z µ 0.000 Normalized
Standard deviation of log z σz 0.10 [D]
Discount rate δ 0.950 [A]
Exogenous exit probability > than 45 years old φe 0.065 [C]
Exogenous exit probability between 30 and 45 φm 0.097 [C]
Exogenous exit probability < than 30 years old φy 0.297 [C]
Employment opportunity cost < than 30 years old by 1.565 [C]
Employment opportunity cost between 30 and 45 bm 3.147 [C]
Employment opportunity cost > than 45 years old be 3.603 [C]
Employers payroll tax τ j 0.300 [B]
Cost of vacancy c 0.021 [C]
Parameter of the Matching function ϕ 0.879 [D]
Worker’s bargaining power β 0.623 [C]
New entrant total firing costs parameter < than 30 years old γy0 0.785w
y
0 [A,B]
New entrants firing costs between 30 and 45 γm0 1.882w
m
0 [A,B]
New entrants firing costs > than 45 years old γe0 2.680w
e
0 [A,B]
Incumbents firing costs < than 30 years old γy 0.785wy [A,B]
Incumbents firing costs between 30 and 45 γm 1.882wm [A,B]
Incumbents firing costs > than 45 years old γe 2.680we [A,B]
Proportion of severance payments ψ 0.66 [B]
Note: [A] Own calculation based on original data; [B] Other studies;
[C] Obtained from model to match the targets; [D] Own assumption
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Before the 1997 reform, payroll taxes are equal for both new entrant and incumbent
jobs. Thus, we assume that τ j0 = τ
j. Using data from the OECD Tax Database, we set
the payroll tax at 0.30 for all groups. Thus, τ y = τm = τ e = 0.30.
We now turn to the firing costs γj0 and γ
j. We first estimate the total severance
payments in years of wages for both new entrant and incumbent workers with permanent
contracts, ψγj0 and ψγ
j, respectively. We use the following information from Osuna (2005):
(i) 20 days of wages per year of seniority for legal indemnities in fair dismissals with a
maximum of 12 monthly wages; (ii) 45 days of wages per year of seniority for unfair
dismissals with a maximum of 42 monthly wages dismissals; (iii) the mean job tenure
Xj = 1/sj for each worker-age group; (iv) procedural wages of around two monthly
wages; and (v) the fact that 72% of all firing processes were declared unfair in 1996.
According to our target unemployment and job finding rates, the calibrated job exit
rates of each group are sy = 0.294, sm = 0.097 and se = 0.065. These rates imply that
the average job tenure in 1996 was 3.4 years for employees younger than 30 years, 10.3
years for those workers between 30 and 45 years, and 15.4 years for employees older than
45 years old.31 Thus, severance payments for new entrants amount to ψγy0 = 0.518× wy0 ,
ψγm0 = 1.242 × wm0 and ψγe0 = 1.769 × we0 of annual wages while for incumbents are
ψγy = 0.518× wy, ψγm = 1.242× wm and ψγe = 1.769× we.32
We next calculate the firing tax costs, (1−ψ)γj0 and (1−ψ)γj. Garibaldi and Violante
(2005) estimate it between 19% and 34% of total firing costs, depending on the layoff
scenario. We consider the last scenario and set ψ equal to 0.66. Thus, the firing tax
component amounts to near 51.5% of severance payments, which implies that for new
entrants the firing tax costs are (1 − ψ)γy0 = 0.267 × wy0 , (1 − ψ)γm0 = 0.640 × wm0 and
(1−ψ)γe0 = 0.911×we0, while for incumbents these costs are equal to (1−ψ)γy = 0.267×wy,
(1− ψ)γm = 0.640× wm and (1− ψ)γe = 0.911× we.33 As a result, total firing costs for
new entrants are equal to γy0 = 0.785×wy0 , γm0 = 1.882×wm0 and γe0 = 2.680×0 we, while
for incumbents these costs are γy = 0.785× wy, γm = 1.882× wm and γe = 2.680× we.
31In our model, entrant and incumbent workers with permanent contracts have the same job destruction
probability, sjt , and, therefore, the same average job duration.





wm =(0.72×Xj×45 days per year + 0.28×Xj×20 days per year + 60 days)/365.
33The annual firing tax calculation for new entrants and incumbents amounts to (1 − ψ)γj0 = ψγj0 ×
0.515× wj0, and (1− ψ)γj = ψγj × 0.515× wj , respectively.
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Following the standard assumption in the literature, as in den Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (2000), the idiosyncratic productivity zt is assumed to be log-normally distributed
with mean µ and standard deviation σz. We normalize the mean of log zt to zero, µ = 0.
With respect to σz, and similar to den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), we set it equal
to 0.1. We also normalized the aggregate labour productivity for the group of workers
with more than 45 years old, Ae = 1.00, and fix Ay and Am to match the observed wage
gap among these group of workers. These two parameters are calibrated together with
the hiring cost c, the wages bargaining power, β, the employment opportunity costs bj
and with the exogenous job exit probabilities φj. We select these parameters to satisfy
the calibration targets: uy = 35.1%, um = 18.5%, ue = 12.4%, χy = 0.547, χm = 0.427
and χe = 0.459, λe = 0.166, λy = 0.486, wy/wm = 0.777 and we/wm = 1.069. This
yields β = 0.623, c = 0.021, Ay = 1.509, Am = 1.02, by = 1.565, bm = 3.147, be = 3.600,
φy = 0.297, φm = 0.097 and φe = 0.065.
6.2.2 Simulated effects
The first principal change in legislation reduced severance payments by around 20% for
workers who made the transition from unemployment to permanent jobs (33 days of wages
per year of seniority, with a maximum of 24 monthly wages, rather than 45 days of wages
per year of seniority with a maximum of 42 monthly wages in case of unfair dismissal).34
The second main modification of the reform was a reduction of 40% and 60% in the
payroll tax for workers under 30 and over 45 years of age who made the transition from
unemployment to permanent jobs. Thus, for new hired workers, τ y0 and τ
e
0 are reduced
from 0.30 to 0.18 and 0.12, while it remains unchanged at 0.30 for both the middle aged
group and the continuing positions of the young and elderly groups. As in the empirical
part, the simulation takes into account the changes experienced by wages just after the
reform. The results of this exercise are displayed in the first panel of Table 13.
The simulated reform yields an increase in the relative wage of the two target groups,
which goes in line with the microeconometric estimated effects reported in section 6.1.
This result lends credibility to the simulation results that try to disentangle the effects of




years×33 days per year + 0.28×XXi years×20 days per year + 60 days)/365.
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Table 13: Simulated effects of the 1997 reform
Simulated post reform variation Var.(%)
New hired worker wages ratio: wy0/w
m
0 9.28
New hired worker wages ratio: we0/w
m
0 13.22
Incumbent worker wages ratio: wy/wm 0.54
Incumbent worker wages ratio: we/wm 0.80
Transition probability from unemp. to perm. (%): Var. perc. points
Job finding probability:χy 0,90
Job finding probability:χe 8.76




Estimated effects of the 1997 reform.
Weighted average* of Table 5 Var.(%)
New hired worker wages ratio:Age<30 5.73
New hired worker wages ratio:Age>45 8.69
Weighted average* second panel of Table 6 Var. perc. points
Transition from unemp to perm: Age<30 7.46
Transition from unemp to perm: Age>45 10.45
Weighted average* of Table 9 Var.(%)
Incumbent worker wages ratio:Age<30 1.87
Incumbent worker wages ratio::Age>45 2.54
Simulated post reform variation with no reduction in γ Var.(%)
New hired worker wages ratio: wy0/w
m
0 4.36
New hired worker wages ratio: we0/w
m
0 0.09
Incumbent worker wages ratio: wy/wm 0.49
Incumbent worker wages ratio: we/wm 0.74
Simulated post reform variation with wage rigidity
in continuing jobs. Var.(%)
New hired worker wages ratio: wy0/w
m
0 8.83
New hired worker wages ratio: we0/w
m
0 12.50
*Note: Weighted average of the estimates of the referred Table, where weights are
population shares of the two gender groups.
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the two policy instruments. With respect to the group of new hired workers older than
45 who made the transition from unemployment to jobs with permanent contracts, the
simulated ratio we0/w
m
0 increased by 13.22%. This result is somewhat higher than the
increase in the weighted average of the estimated effects of 8.69%, reported in the second
panel of Table 13. In turn, the relative wage for younger unemployed workers who do
the same transition increases by 9.28%, which is also larger than the estimated one of
5.73%.35
The simulated employment effects of the reform also go in the same direction as the
ones observed in the empirical model, showing a higher increase in the transition prob-
ability from unemployment to permanent employment in the group of people above 45
years. In this group, the simulated transition probability from unemployment to perma-
nent employment increases by 8.76 percentage points, which is larger than that for the
younger group (0,90 percentage points). Empirical estimates show a weighted increase of
10.45 and 7.46 percentage points in each group, respectively.36 As a result of the change
in job finding probability, unemployment rates fall in the elderly group and remain almost
constant in the younger group. According to our simulated results, the unemployment
rate of older workers decreases from 0.124% to 0.107% while the unemployment rate of
younger workers increases from 0.352% to 0.354%. Notice that the unemployment rate of
the middle age workers also remains almost unchanged, going from 18.5% to 18.7%.
In spite of the absence of adjustment in the firing costs and payroll taxes of continuing
workers with permanent contracts, the model simulates an increase of 0.54% and 0.80%
in the ratios wy/wm and we/wm, which are again in line with a weighted average of the
estimated effects of 1.87% and 2.54%, reported in the second panel of Table 13. As we
mentioned in the theoretical section of the model, these positive effects take place because
the reform increases the surplus of new employment positions. Incumbent employees know
that wages of new entrant positions are higher than before the reform, which make them
less worry about losing their job and starting a new employment relationship. As a result,
incumbent employees increase their implicity bargaining power and, therefore, negotiate
an increment in their current wages.
35The counterpart weighted average estimates that correct for sample selection are very close to the
uncorrected ones: 5.49% and 8.49% for younger and older workers, respectively.
36Notice, once again, that the simulated increase in the employment probabilities go in line with the
positive employment effects estimated by Kugler, Jimeno, and Hernanz (2002).
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The simulation also permits to separately identify and quantify the effects of each
policy change. That is, we can compute the impact of changing either firing costs or payroll
taxes. To calculate the impact of reducing solely payroll taxes, we simulate a scenario
with no reduction in firing costs, keeping the rest of post-reform parameters constant.
The results of this exercise are presented in the third panel of Table 13. Remember that,
according to our theoretical model, the reduction in payroll taxes of new hired workers
have an unclear effect on wages. Our simulated results show that payroll taxes only
account for 46% and 1% of the increase in new entrant wages of young and older workers
with respect to middle aged workers. However, the reduction in payroll taxes explains
most of the the increase in the wages of young and older workers with incumbent positions
with respect to middle aged workers (90% and 92.5% of the wage increase, respectively).
Our final simulated scenario considers wage rigidity in continuing permanent contracts.
Wage rigidities vary a lot across countries and they are correlated to employment pro-
tection legislation. For example, in a recent study, Babeckandyacute, Du-Caju, Kosma,
Lawless, Messina, and Randotilde (2010) show that wage rigidity is positively associated
with the extent of permanent contracts and this effect is stronger in countries with stricter
employment protection regulations. For the Spanish case, De la Roca (2008) shows that
wages for newly hired workers are more volatile than wages of ongoing employees. To
check the sensitivity of the model to the degree of wage rigidity, we next keep the Nash
bargaining assumption in the wages of new hired workers with permanent contracts but
set the wages of incumbent workers to their calibrated values before the reform. The
results of this exercise are presented in the bottom panel of Table 13 and are very similar
to the simulated post-reform variation in the first panel.
7 Final remarks
This paper provides empirical evidence of the effect on wages of two important elements
of non-wage labour costs, using a labour market reform in Spain which reduced firing
costs and payroll taxes after 1997 for certain population subgroups.
To gain a theoretical insight into the effects of these two provisions we extend the
matching model with heterogeneous workers (Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2007)) to
accommodate the salient features of the reform. Since the firm does not incur in firing
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costs when there is no agreement on a wage between the firm and the employee in the
first encounter, we permit the wage bargaining process to differ between new entrants and
incumbent workers. A reduction in firing cost in new created positions increases wages
of new entrants through an increase in their implicit bargaining power. The reduction
in firing costs also increases the wages of incumbent workers not directly affected by the
reform. In this case, with higher wages in new entry positions, incumbent employees are
less worried about losing their jobs and starting a new employment relationship. This
increases the implicit bargaining power of incumbents and, therefore, their wages. In turn,
the reduction of payroll taxes has an unclear effect on both new entrant and incumbent
wages. In sum, the theoretical model shows that the overall wage effect of the 1997 reform
on both new entrants and incumbent wages is entirely an empirical question.
For the empirical analysis we use a unique longitudinal data set, which contains in-
formation on individual job histories from social security records and basic individual
characteristics from the census. Since we have information on each and every single job
spell, we avoid the possibility of aggregation bias.
Our empirical strategy exploits the substantial reduction in firing costs and payroll
taxes brought about by the 1997 Spanish labour market reform for young and old workers
who got a permanent job from unemployment. Ours is the first study that relies on this
source of indentification to examine the effect of firing costs and payroll taxes. Since the
changes did not cover all workers, we use a difference-in-differences estimator to obtain
short-term causal effects. The possible selection into treatment bias that arises because
firing cost and labour tax reductions apply only to workers transiting from unemployment
to permanent employment is addressed with a two-step Heckman correction model. The
first step of the model is identified with information on previous unemployment spells.
Identification of the causal effects of the reform may be threatened if employers substitute
workers not affected by the reform for targeted workers. We show that substitution of
workers does not take place. Our estimates suggest that decreased firing costs and payroll
taxes have a positive effect on wages (and also on employment). We find larger effects
for older than for younger workers and for men than for women. The reform also has an
positive impact on incumbent workers’ wages, which is somewhat smaller than the effect
on entry wages.
These findings are robust to (i) an alternative identification strategy that exploits an
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exogenous variation in the use of Permanent Employment Promotion contracts, which
reduce firing costs and payroll taxes, (ii) to enlarging the sample period to four years,
two before and two after the Reform, and (iii) to restricting the sample to workers with
ages close to the cut-off set by the Reform to define the two targeted groups, i.e. our
treatment groups.
Consistent with our model, we find heterogeneous effects, larger for workers with larger
bargaining power. That is, the positive effect of the Reform is larger for workers in the
private sector, with higher professional category, and earning higher wages.
Calibrating the model and simulating the reform provides a robustness check of the
estimated effects and allows to separately identify and quantify the effects of each policy
change, which cannot be estimated since the two provisions changed at the same time.
Simulated effects are consistent with the estimated effects, though somewhat larger for
new hired targeted workers and somewhat smaller for incumbent employees. Regarding
the relative impact of each provision, our simulations suggest that more than 90% of the
increase in incumbent wages is due to the reduction in payroll taxes, while the reduction
in firing costs accounts for less than 40% of the increase in the wages of new entrants.
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A Appendix
A.1 Main changes in dismissal costs and payroll taxes Due to
the 1997 Reform for temporary workers
Table 14: Principal Changes in Dismissal Cost and Payroll Tax due to the
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A.2 Sensibility checks with wider time windows (2 years)
Table 15: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment (95-96 vs 98-99). OLS estimation
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age<30 0.037 1.96 0.057 2.70
Age>45 -0.002 -0.07 0.067 2.18
Post 1997 0.076 6.48 0.096 7.17
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.072 4.33 0.055 2.99
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.109 4.51 0.075 2.75
N 46,877 33,400
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years.
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A.3 Full estimates of wage regression
Table 16: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. OLS estimates.
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age<30 0.047 1.72 0.036 1.12
Age>45 -0.025 -0.66 0.127 2.91
Post 1997 0.079 4.47 0.075 3.63
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.066 2.66 0.045 3.43
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.094 2.85 0.076 2.07
Age 0.041 5.90 0.033 4.11
Age square -0.0005 -5.63 -0.0005 -4.94
Experience 0.0003 7.88 0.0001 16.17
Unemployment benefits 0.131 9.63 0.077 4.46
Full time 0.537 20.33 0.506 24.97
Firm size 0.0005 9.33 0.0002 3.97
Private 0.045 4.67 0.064 4.61
Duration last spell -0.0001 -3.94 -0.0003 -3.27
Previous firm size 2.87e-07 0.91 7.26e-07 0.00
Num. of perm. contracts -0.002 -9.98 -0.0011 -6.27
(a) Previous type of contract
Permanent 0.106 5.47 0.076 3.54
Temporary -0.026 -9.98 - 0.002 -0.11
(b)Profesional Category
Semi-skilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled clerks 0.185 12.76 0.267 17.11
Engineers and graduates, chief and departmental heads 0.524 28.76 0.650 26.58
(c)Industry
Industry. 0.366 6.26 0.564 6.83
Construction 0.215 3.56 0.470 4.83
Trade, Transport and Hotels 0.090 1.56 0.461 5.65
Finance 0.190 3.16 0.435 5.24
Public Administration -0.015 -0.25 0.497 6.02
(d)Region
Dummys included YES YES
N 25,904 18,371
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. Reference categories: Previous type of
contract (no contract), Professional category (Unskilled jobs), Industry (Agriculture)
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A.4 Full estimates of wage and selection regressions
Table 17: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemp. to perm. employment. Heckman selection model (two stage method)
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Wage equation
Age<30 0.048 1.76 0.036 1.12
Age>45 -0.034 -0.91 0.127 2.91
Post 1997 0.098 5.37 0.075 3.58
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.059 2.39 0.049 3.44
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.088 2.65 0.080 2.08
Age 0.033 4.67 0.034 4.07
Age square -0.0004 -4.15 -0.0005 -4.88
Experience 0.00002 5.40 0.0001 14.51
Unemployment benefits 0.124 8.79 0.077 4.45
Full time 0.538 20.30 0.506 24.99
Firm size 0.00005 9.21 0.00002 3.97
Private 0.052 5.32 0.046 4.04
Duration last spell -0.00001 -5.18 -0.0003 -3.21
Previous firm size 3.56e-07 1.12 -6.43e-07 -0.00
Num. of perm. contracts -0.003 -10.77 -0.0011 -5.23
(a) Previous type of contract
Permanent 0.122 5.98 0.076 3.36
Temporary -0.006 -0.44 - 0.002 -0.11
(b)Profesional Category
Semi-skilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled clerks 0.180 12.35 0.268 17.13
Engineers and graduates, chief and departmental heads 0.513 27.92 0.650 26.60
(c)Industry
Industry. 0.359 6.19 0.564 6.83
Construction 0.218 3.63 0.470 4.83
Trade, Transport and Hotels 0.081 1.40 0.461 5.65
Finance 0.185 3.10 0.435 5.24
Public Administration -0.014 -0.22 0.497 6.01
(d)Region
Dummys included YES YES
N 25,904 18,371
Selection equation
Age<30 0.002 0.08 0.025 1.08
Age>45 0.074 2.68 0.189 5.36
Post 1997 -0.251 -19.71 -0.146 -9.45
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.080 4.72 0.065 3.19
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.119 4.95 0.083 4.40
Age 0.105 22.99 0.057 9.94
Age square -0.001 -25.35 -0.0008 -10.41
Experience 0.0001 29.13 0.0001 30.96
Unemployment benfits 0.040 3.81 0.032 2.53
Duration last spell -0.0008 -16.54 -0.0011 -19.95
Previous firm size 1.61e-07 6.19 1.30e-07 3.86
Num. of perm. contracts 0.053 199.69 0.060 163.34
(a) Dummys of Previous type of contract included YES YES
(b) Dummys of Lag Profesional Category included YES YES
(c) Dummys of Lag Industry included YES YES
(d) Dummys of Region included YES YES
Unemployment spells -0.063 -108.34 -0.052 -79.42
N 277,394 181,432
Selection coefficients
Inverse Mill’s ratio (λ) -0.103 -4.56 0.254 7.54
ρ -0.113 0.389
σ 0.911 0.880
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. Reference categories: Previous type of
contract (no contract), Professional category (Unskilled jobs), Industry (Agriculture)). ρ is the correlation
between error terms of the wage and selection equation. σ is the standard error of the residual in the wage
equation.
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A.5 Alternative Exclusion Restrictions
Table 18: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. Heckman selection model (two stage
method). Robustness check: Alternative Exclusion Restrictions
Instrument: Instrument:
Number of permanet contracts Previous type of contract
Men Women Men Women
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat
1. WAGE EFFECTS
Uncorrected wage effects (wage eq.)
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.062 2.50 0.046 3.44 0.067 2.70 0.045 3.86
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.095 2.89 0.077 2.07 0.093 2.82 0.077 2.01
N 25,904 18,371 25,904 18,371
Selection coefficients
Inverse Mill’s ratio (λ) -0.198 -0.95 0.010 0.41 -0.005 -0.24 0.025 1.20
ρ -0.021 0.011 -0.005 0.029
σ 0.906 0.880 0.907 0.881
Corrected wage effects*
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.062 10.91 0.046 5.26 0.067 11.74 0.045 5.10
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.095 16.79 0.077 8.75 0.093 16.39 0.077 8.72
2. EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS
Employment effects (selection eq.)
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.080 4.71 0.064 3.19 0.092 5.69 0.065 4.35
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.115 4.77 0.083 3.40 0.086 3.82 0.080 3.66
Instrument 0.054 199.57 0.060 163.34 0.192 11.70 0.274 13.99
-0.465 -38.11 -0.63 -42.96
N 277,415 181,432 277,415 181,432
Marginal prob. of emp. effects
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.008 3.72 0.012 3.17 0.009 3.89 0.009 3.12
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.013 4.31 0.014 3.18 0.015 4.54 0.010 3.10
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. ρ is the correlation between error terms of
the wage and selection equation. σ is the standard error of the residual in the wage equation.
*Since the two treatment variables appear in both the outcome and selection equations, the marginal effects
and their standard errors are not simply given by the second stage estimates reported in the upper panel
(see footnote 27).
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A.6 Full estimates for incumbents
Table 19: Effects of the Reform on Wages for the incumbents. Censored models with FE
estimation.
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age<30 -0.019 -2.07 0.024 2.55
Age>45 -0.021 2.66 0.046 4.14
Post 1997 0.020 3.10 0.123 14.40
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.018 3.83 0.020 3.60
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.025 3.73 0.026 3.52
Age 0.071 32.51 0.063 23.63
Age square -0.0008 -32.30 -0.0007 -23.50
Experience 0.00002 23.52 0.0001 48.40
Unemployment benefits -0.179 -4.82 -0.034 -3.66
Full time 0.573 29.63 0.925 180.87
Firm size 0.00002 26.61 9.24e-06 10.15
Private 0.066 7.13 0.068 4.79
Duration last spell -8.97e-06 -2.48 -0.0003 -10.23
Previous firm size -4.56e-07 0.91 -4.41e-07 -1.95
Num. of perm. contracts -0.0004 -2.41 -0.0009 -4.14
(a) Previous type of contract
Permanent 0.040 4.58 0.075 7.25
Temporary 0.013 1.88 - 0.041 -5.26
(b)Profesional Category
Semi-skilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled clerks 0.235 59.55 0.321 68.10
Engineers and graduates, chief and departmental heads 0.544 118.22 0.738 111.10
(c)Industry
Industry. 0.174 10.21 0.404 14.24
Construction -0.0008 -0.04 0.226 7.03
Trade, Transport and Hotels -0.011 -0.64 0.288 10.28
Finance 0.122 7.00 0.276 9.80
Public Administration -0.017 -0.97 0.280 9.95
(d)Region
Dummys included YES YES
N 203,053 114,897
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. Reference categories: Previous type of
contract (no contract), Professional category (Unskilled jobs), Industry (Agriculture)
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A.7 An alternative identification strategy
Table 20: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment, with No Employment Promotion
contract. OLS estimates.
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
Age<30 0.037 1.18 0.021 0.61
Age>45 -0.022 -0.58 0.110 2.48
Post 1997 0.066 2.74 0.076 3.72
(Age<30)*(Post 1997) 0.017 0.55 0.016 0.54
(Age>45)*(Post 1997) 0.024 0.67 0.017 0.45
Age 0.042 5.59 0.035 4.06
Age square -0.0004 -5.35 -0.0005 -4.70
Experience 0.0002 6.38 0.0006 14.83
Unemployment benefits 0.095 5.92 0.054 2.97
Full time 0.546 17.46 0.528 25.09
Firm size 0.0005 8.11 0.0002 4.17
Private 0.049 4.43 0.065 3.63
Duration last spell -0.0002 -3.27 -0.0004 -4.48
Previous firm size 5.95e-07 1.68 1.17e-07 0.27
Num. of perm. contracts -0.004 -16.79 -0.0026 -14.02
(a) Previous type of contract
Permanent 0.253 11.13 0.254 11.62
Temporary -0.029 -16.79 0.005 0.29
(b)Profesional Category
Semi-skilled workers, skilled and semi-skilled clerks 0.177 10.71 0.265 16.25
Engineers and graduates, chief and departmental heads 0.501 24.14 0.639 25.44
(c)Industry
Industry. 0.333 5.06 0.501 6.05
Construction 0.181 2.67 0.375 3.79
Trade, Transport and Hotels 0.063 0.98 0.369 4.52
Finance 0.158 2.35 0.357 4.29
Public Administration 0.067 21.48 0.401 4.85
(d)Region
Dummys included YES YES
N 22,675 17,599
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 45 years. Reference categories: Previous type of
contract (no contract), Professional category (Unskilled jobs), Industry (Agriculture)
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A.8 Restrict the sample to ages around the policy thresholds
Table 21: Effects of the Reform on Wages for men and women who experience a transition
from unemployment to permanent employment. Restricted age groups. OLS estimates
Men Women
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat
(Age 26 to 29)*(Post 1997) 0.075 3.96 0.067 3.47
N 8,913 6,074
(Age 45 to 49)*(Post 1997) 0.111 4.01 0.082 3.99
N 4,488 3,247
Notes: Control group are men and women aged 30 to 33 years for the first restricted group and men and
women aged 40 to 44 years for the second restricted group .
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